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NOTE
LAW-ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND SELF-HELP
REPOSSESSION: A STATE-ACTION APPROACH
Aaron Loterstein*
Repossession of secured collateral is a fundamental component of the con-
sumer credit industry. The Uniform Commercial Code authorizes a secured
party to engage in self-help repossession of secured collateral under section
9-609, so long as the repossession takes place without "breach of the peace."
While that term is undefined, several courts have adopted a counterintuitive
rule, holding that a law-enforcement officer's presence during a self-help re-
possession-regardless of purpose or level of involvement-creates a breach
of the peace. The Official Comments to the Code have seemingly endorsed
this position as well. This Note rejects the primary justifications courts have
offered to justify a bright-line rule and makes clear that an officer's involve-
ment in self-help repossession is unrelated to breach of the peace. The
correct approach to law-enforcement-officer involvement in self-help repos-
sessions asks whether the officer's presence constitutes state action. An
officer's involvement should only invalidate a repossession where it is
deemed state action sufficient to trigger a constitutional violation under sec-
tion 1983. In such cases, the repossession is not of the sort authorized by
section 9-609 and would therefore be wrongful, rather than a breach of the
peace. In accordance with this approach, this Note concludes with a pro-
posal for a modified Official Comment to section 9-609.
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INTRODUCTION
The repossession industry is dangerous. Tensions frequently run high, and
when an unsuspecting car owner learns that his vehicle is being repossessed,
his reaction is unpredictable and can be violent.' Sensationalist portrayals of
repossessions in television shows such as Operation Repo can attract violent
personalities to the repossession industry,2 further contributing to the
likelihood of violence during repossessions. The sheer number of vehicle
repossessions far exceeds home mortgage defaults.3 Despite the risk of
violence, repossession is a vital aspect of the consumer credit industry. Of the
various rights triggered upon debtor default, repossession is paramount.4 It
provides a secured party 5 with an avenue of recourse to collect at least part
of a debt owed to him, which also provides some assurance that a debtor
will comply with repayment obligations.6
The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") provides a secured party with
the right to repossess its collateral upon default in two ways: repossession
by judicial process and repossession by self-help.7 Because of the financial
and time-related costs associated with reducing a claim to judgment, se-
1. See JOHN W. VAN ALST & RICK JURGENS, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., REPO
MADNESS: How AUTOMOBILE REPOSSESSIONS ENDANGER OWNERS, AGENTS AND THE PUBLIC
(2010); Violence Between Repo Men, Car Owners Rising, NBCNEWS.coM, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29427734/ns/us-news-life/t/violence-between-repo-men-car-owners-
rising (last updated Feb. 27, 2009).
2. Chris Arnold, Violence Spurs Calls to Rein in the Repo Man, NPR (Mar. 14, 2010,
6:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 124654374.
3. Nathalie Martin & Ozymandias Adams, Grand Theft Auto Loans: Repossession and
Demographic Realities in Title Lending, 77 Mo. L. REV. 41, 45 (2012).
4. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 26-6,
at 1335 (6th ed. 2010) (noting that repossession is "[iln many cases the creditor's ultimate
threat"); Stephen M. Cozart, Note, Through the Eyes of the Debtor: Mississippi Reexamines
the Breach of the Peace Exception to Uniform Commercial Code Section 9-503, 15 Miss. C. L.
REv. 145, 145 (1994) ("Self-help repossession is the keystone on which our consumer econo-
my rests.").
5. The UCC defines a secured party as "a person in whose favor a security interest is
created or provided for under a security agreement, whether or not any obligation to be se-
cured is outstanding." U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(73)(A) (2012). Several older cases and commentators
refer to such parties as creditors. For the purposes of this Note, the terms should be viewed
interchangeably.
6. See sources cited supra note 4.
7. U.C.C. § 9-609. Aside from repossession, the UCC makes other rights available to a
secured party as well. See U.C.C. § 9-601.
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cured parties prefer instead to engage in self-help repossession.8 The UCC
only imposes one statutory limitation on self-help repossession: it may not
result in a "breach of the peace."9 Typically, independent contractors, popu-
larly known as "repo men," perform such repossessions. Even though a repo
agent is an independent contractor, a secured party who hires one will still
be held personally liable for a breach of the peace.' 0 The most commonly
repossessed goods are automobiles, as they are frequently purchased with
credit and are easy to transport. Section 9-609, however, applies to any col-
lateral in which a lender has a security interest.
Despite its importance as the sole statutory limitation on self-help repos-
session, the UCC does not define "breach of the peace" or explain how one
can avoid doing so during a repossession. Some scholars have called for the
UCC to clearly define the contours of breach of the peace," though the
drafters of revised Article 9 considered and rejected these proposals. 12 Ac-
cordingly, in the Official Comment to revised section 9-609, the drafters
explain that they intentionally chose not to define the term "breach of the
peace," instead leaving it open to judicial determination.' 3 Though the
breach-of-the-peace inquiry implicates several considerations, the essential
question that often underlies courts' decisions regarding breach of the peace
in this context is whether the repossession created an unreasonable risk of
violence.' 4 In fact, one can understand many standard examples of breach of
the peace by framing the rule's motivation as avoidance of violence. 5
Despite the lack of statutory guidance in defining breach of the peace, an
Official Comment to section 9-609 notes a peculiar rule:
This section does not authorize a secured party who repossesses without
judicial process to utilize the assistance of a law-enforcement officer. A
8. Michael W. Dunagan, Vehicle Repossessions and Resales Under Revised UCC
Article 9: The Requirements and the Consequences of Non-Compliance, 54 CONSUMER FIN.
L.Q. REP. 192, 193 (2000).
9. U.C.C. § 9-609(b)(2). Nonetheless, a minority of states have imposed additional
requirements on self-help repossessors. See CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW
CTR., REPOSSESSIONS § 6.3.2, at 205 (7th ed. 2010 & Supp. 2011).
10. Jean Braucher, The Repo Code: A Study of Adjustment to Uncertainty in Commer-
cial Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 549, 562-63 (1997) ("[Clourts have consistently held that the
lender is liable for a breach of the peace by an independent contractor. The courts have charac-
terized section 9-503 [the predecessor to current section 9-609] as recognizing a nondelegable
duty to avoid breaches of the peace." (footnote omitted)).
11. E.g., id. at 566-91, 614-15; see also Alvin C. Harrell, Revised Article 9 Moves
Closer to Completion, 52 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 93, 99 n.16 (1998).
12. Harrell, supra note 11, at 99 n.16.
13. U.C.C. § 9-609 cmt. 3 ("Like former Section 9-503, this section does not define or
explain the conduct that will constitute a breach of the peace, leaving that matter for continu-
ing development by the courts.").
14. Braucher, supra note 10, at 571; see also Ryan McRobert, Comment, Defining
"Breach of the Peace" in Self-Help Repossessions, 87 WASH. L. REv. 569, 581-82 (2012).
15. For example, one case discussing the use of trickery in repossession presented the
concern as one of impermissible violence. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Byrd, 351 So. 2d 557, 559
(Ala. 1977) (noting that trickery is "fraught with the likelihood of resulting violence").
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number of cases have held that a repossessing secured party's use of a law-
enforcement officer without benefit of judicial process constituted a failure
to comply with former Section 9-503.6
This Comment is ambiguous. The fact that section 9-609 "does not
authorize" the use of a law-enforcement officer is not to say that the
statute expressly forbids it. In addition, the Comment's reference to the
"assistance" of law-enforcement officers may only intend to prohibit law-
enforcement officers from actively facilitating repossession, rather than
standing by to keep the peace.'7 Scholars and courts have interpreted the
Comment as an unqualified prohibition on the participation of law-
enforcement officers, 8 and, absent further clarification, this interpretation of
the Official Comment is compelling.
This rule against the use of law-enforcement officers in self-help
repossession is counterintuitive. Why would the involvement of a law-
enforcement officer constitute a breach of the very peace that he has sworn
to protect? Moreover, the Official Comment does not clearly indicate how
much of an active role-if any-an officer may take in a repossession
before a breach of the peace occurs. This Note addresses these questions and
concludes that the current state of the law is more nuanced than section 9-
609's comments suggest.
Part I argues that the most prevalent theory that courts use to explain
why a law-enforcement officer's involvement constitutes a breach of the
peace-frustration of the debtor's right to object-is unsatisfactory. First, it
is based on a misconstruction of existing case law that turned a fact-specific
inquiry into a bright-line prohibition of law-enforcement-officer involve-
ment. Second, the debtor does not have a right to object under the UCC,
which, on the contrary, compels the debtor to cooperate with lawful repos-
session efforts.
Part II argues that the best approach to law-enforcement-officer
involvement in self-help repossessions is one that considers whether a
law-enforcement officer's presence constitutes state action. When a law-
enforcement officer's involvement is repossession-facilitating rather than
peacekeeping, it becomes state action, which makes the officer's
involvement wrongful because it is neither the self-help repossession nor the
judicial-process repossession authorized by the UCC. This approach
provides a more nuanced and logically consistent framework for addressing
law-enforcement involvement in self-help repossession.
Drawing upon this framework, Part III suggests language for an Official
Comment to section 9-609 to replace the less precise rule that it currently
endorses. This proposal unambiguously links the issue of law-enforcement
16. U.C.C. § 9-609 cmt. 3.
17. If this is the correct reading of the Official Comment, it is consistent with the dis-
tinction I draw between repossession-facilitating and peacekeeping actions, see infra Section
II.B. The Comment's ambiguity, however, still requires clarification to make this point explic-
it.
18. E.g., WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 26-7, at 1337; see also infra Part I.
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involvement to the state-action inquiry and makes clear that the question is
generally not one of breach of the peace. Part III then offers several illustra-
tions to demonstrate application of the state-action approach.
I. FRUSTRATION OF THE RIGHT TO OBJECT AS BREACH OF THE PEACE
Even prior to the promulgation of the UCC, courts found improper the
involvement of law-enforcement officers in self-help repossession. 19 In one
of the earliest formulations of this principle, the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington stated that a "mortgagee becomes a trespasser by going upon the
premises of the mortgagor, accompanied by a deputy sheriff who has no
legal process, but claims to act colore officii, and taking possession with-
out the active resistance of the mortgagor."2 The court further explained
that this type of behavior violates societal order, noting that "[t]o obtain
possession under such a show and pretense of authority is to trifle with the
obedience of citizens to the law and its officers."2 1
Thus, according to this and similar cases from this era, the mere presence
of a law-enforcement officer at a self-help repossession constituted a breach
of the peace only if the officer acted colore officii, under color of office. The
significance of acting under color of office was the officer's use of his law-
enforcement authority as a basis for the repossession. An action was colore
officii when the officer acted beyond the scope of official duties but as if he
were acting pursuant to law-enforcement authority. Accordingly, these cases
did not hold that the officer's involvement was inherently a breach of the
peace. Where an officer did not act under color of office, there was nothing
improper about the repossession, assuming that no independent breach of
the peace occurred.
Early cases often framed this inquiry in terms of intimidation. That is,
where an officer facilitated the repossession by improperly intimidating the
debtor with the weight of his position, a breach of the peace occurred.22 The
underlying issue was that an officer's use of his position to repossess proper-
ty exceeds the scope of his official duties.2 To find a breach of the peace,
not only did courts require that the officer intend to intimidate, but they also
19. Robert M. Lloyd, Lender Liability for Wrongful Repossession, 114 BANKING L.J.
612, 623 (1997).
20. McClellan v. Gaston, 51 P. 1062, 1064 (Wash. 1898). "Colore officii" means under
color of office. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 302 (9th ed. 2009).
21. McClellan, 51 P at 1064.
22. See, e.g., Waggoner v. Koon, 168 P. 217, 217 (Okla. 1917) ("The only restrictions
upon the mode by which the mortgagee secures possession of the mortgaged property, after
breach of condition, is that he must act in an orderly manner and without creating a breach of
the peace, and must not intimidate by securing the aid of an officer who pretends to act colore
officii.").
23. Cf infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (providing other examples of officers
acting outside the scope of their official duties).
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considered whether the debtorfelt intimidated.24 The inquiry was therefore
case specific and did not assume that an officer's presence was inherently
intimidating enough to invalidate the repossession automatically.2 5 However,
these cases predated the UCC and did not consider this question under its
statutory framework for self-help repossession.
The remainder of this Part argues that post-UCC cases that eschew this
fact-specific intimidation inquiry and instead adopt a bright-line prohibition
against law-enforcement-officer presence at self-help repossessions are in
error. Section L.A explains that this bright-line rule is premised on the notion
that law-enforcement-officer presence impermissibly stifles a "right" that the
debtor does not have-the right to object. Section I.B demonstrates that the
foremost case to utilize this theory misconstrued the line of cases on which
it relied. Section I.C argues that debtors do not have a right to object to a
repossession because that right would run counter to the UCC's requirement
that the debtor facilitate the lawful repossession of collateral.
A. Genesis of the Right to Object
The first case to consider the issue of officer involvement in self-help re-
possession under the UCC was Stone Machinery Co. v. Kessler.26 Although
Stone Machinery was a Washington Court of Appeals decision, courts in
other jurisdictions have relied on its holding,27 presumably due to a dearth of
case law on the subject. This Section therefore focuses extensively on Stone
Machinery and its rationale.
In 1966, a debtor purchased a tractor from Stone Machinery but did not
make timely payments.28 A credit manager from Stone Machinery located
the tractor and sought to repossess it.2 9 Fearing violence, he requested assis-
tance from a local sheriff, who agreed to help after examining
24. See, e.g., Beneficial Fin. Co. of Tulsa v. Wiener, 405 P.2d 691, 696 (Okla. 1965)
("By securing aid of the constable who pretended to act under his authority, a question was
presented for the jury to determine whether plaintiff was intimidated, and for such reason let
defendants remove her furniture.").
25. The 1917 edition of the CORPUS JURIS provided as follows:
According to some authorities the mortgagee must not intimidate by securing the aid of
an officer who pretends to act colore officii; but the mere fact that the mortgagee is ac-
companied by a constable or other officer who does not act under color of his office, and
where it does not appear that any force or threats were used in taking possession, will not
make the mortgagee liable for trespass.
II C.J. Chattel Mortgages § 257 (1917) (footnote omitted).
26. 463 P.2d 651 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970).
27. See, e.g., In re 53 Foot Trawler Pegasus, No. 6:08-cv-117-Orl-18DAB, 2008 WL
4938345, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2008); Fleming-Dudley v. Legal Investigations, Inc., No.
05 C 4648, 2007 WL 952026, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2007); Walker v. Walthall, 588 P.2d
863, 865 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); First & Farmers Bank of Somerset, Inc. v. Henderson, 763
S.W.2d 137, 141 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
28. Stone Mach., 463 P.2d at 652.
29. Id.
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documentation confirming Stone Machinery's right to repossess the trac-
tor.30 The sheriff took an active role in the repossession, accompanying the
credit manager and proclaiming, "We come to pick up the tractor."'" The
debtor protested but did not offer physical resistance, allegedly because of
the officer's presence .3 The credit manager completed the repossession, and
the debtor sued for wrongful repossession.33 The trial court awarded the
debtor more than $30,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. 34
On appeal, the court considered the legality of the self-help repossession
by turning to Oregon's adoption of former UCC section 9-503, which pro-
vided that "a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can
be done without breach of the peace. '35 Ostensibly relying on previous cas-
es,36 the court held that the officer's involvement constituted a breach of the
peace.37 The court reasoned that the sheriff's involvement served to "prevent
the defendant Kessler from exercising his right to resist by all lawful and
reasonable means a nonjudicial take-over."38 The Stone Machinery court
seems to have invented this alleged "right to resist." Such a notion was not
apparent in prior case law and, as discussed infra in Section I.C, it conflict-
ed with long-accepted principles of repossession.
Thus, the court effectively stated that because an officer's mere presence
has the ability to intimidate the debtor into compliance with the reposses-
sion, the officer's involvement constituted a breach of the peace as a matter
of law. It had taken the previously independent rule against using an officer
for intimidation and folded it into the prohibition against breaching the
peace. The upshot of this analysis was a bright-line rule against officer in-
volvement in repossessions based upon frustration of the debtor's supposed
"right to object." Subsequent cases, relying on Stone Machinery's misinter-
pretation of the law and creation of a previously nonexistent right to object,
have framed the inquiry in this way as well.39
This is not a question of mere semantics. The cases on which Stone
Machinery relied dealt largely with law-enforcement officers who acted
30. Id.
31. Id. at652-53.
32. Id. at 653.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 652.
35. Id. at 653 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 79.5030 (repealed 2001)).
36. The Stone Machinery court cited several of the pre-UCC cases referenced above,
such as Burgin v. Universal Credit Co., 98 P.2d 291, 296 (Wash. 1940). Stone Mach., 463 P.2d
at 654. However, whereas those cases kept distinct the question of a breach of the peace from
that of officer intimidation of the debtor under color of office, Stone Machinery combined the
two for the purposes of its analysis. See id. at 654 (describing the officer's involvement using
language that originally referred to breach of the peace due to actual violence).
37. Id. at 655.
38. Id.
39. See cases cited supra note 27.
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beyond the scope of their official duties 40 or threatened the use of vio-
lence.41 In such cases, courts correctly applied the law in finding the
repossessions invalid. Stone Machinery went one step further, however,
holding that officer involvement is always unlawful intimidation and consti-
tutes a per se breach of the peace.42
While one can certainly characterize an officer's presence as intimidating
in that it might reduce one's willingness to engage in certain behaviors, it is
not the same type of intimidation usually considered a breach of the peace.
For example, in an Alabama decision, a court of appeals stated that, in the
context of a breach of the peace inquiry, "[t]he threats or intimidation referred
to are those which if carried out would amount to a breach of peace or if re-
sisted would tend to promote a breach of peace."43 As one practitioner puts it,
"[T]o quote [a] line from Repo Man, you should not say something like: 'You
gonna give me my car, or do I gotta go to your house and shove your dog's
head down the toilet?'"" Similarly, if a repo agent were to show up at a debt-
or's door with a shotgun, that intimidation would be sufficient to trigger a
breach of the peace. Taken to its conclusion, the implied threat in such a case
is that the repo agent will use the weapon if the debtor refuses to assist in the
repossession. In contrast, an officer's presence does not typically carry with it
the same implied threat of violence and so would not alone create a breach of
the peace because of intimidation.4" Stone Machinery did not recognize this
distinction; rather, it utilized a broad definition of intimidation that includes
any action that limits the debtor's "right to object" to the repossession.
B. Exploring the Stone Machinery Rationale
Stone Machinery and related cases, which hold that frustrating a debtor's
objections results in a breach of the peace, rely on the logic that in an
officer's absence, violence would erupt or the debtor would vocally
objecta6 -outcomes that would normally result in a breach of the peace.47
40. See, e.g., McClellan v. Gaston, 51 P. 1062, 1064 (Wash. 1898) (describing how the
sheriff personally repossessed collateral where the creditor had filed a foreclosure action).
41. See, e.g., Ray v. Navarre, 147 P. 1019, 1021 (Okla. 1915) (concerning repossession
of collateral with the assistance of a law-enforcement officer "by means of force, threats, and a
display of firearms").
42. See Stone Mach., 463 P.2d at 757.
43. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Ditton, 295 So. 2d 408, 411 (Ala. Civ. App. 1974).
44. Patrick W. Begos, How to Seize Stuff, GPSOLO, July/Aug. 2010,
available at http://www.americanbar.orglnewsletter/publications/gp-solo-magazine.home/gp
-solomagazinejindex/sololawyerseizereplevin reposession.html.
45. In situations in which the officer threatens violence, however, the intimidation
would be sufficient. See Ray, 147 P. 1019.
46. See Stone Mach., 463 P.2d at 655; First & Farmers Bank of Somerset, Inc. v. Hen-
derson, 763 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); see also 79 C.J.S. Secured Transactions
§ 198 (2006) ("The use of a law enforcement officer without judicial process is treated as the
equivalent of a breach of the peace, where the strong arm of the law is needed to prevent vio-
lence." (footnote omitted)).
47. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 26-7, at 1337.
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The argument concludes that the officer's mere presence constitutes
"constructive force, intimidation and oppression" and therefore, absent a
prohibition on the presence of law-enforcement officers, the creditor would
always be able to circumvent the statute by involving law enforcement in
repossessions.
41
This line of reasoning misunderstands the relationship between secured
party and debtor and the fundamental concern that motivates the breach of
the peace proscription: avoiding violence. Because the UCC's drafters left
"breach of the peace" undefined, courts are left to offer their own interpreta-
tions of the term and have utilized various standards.49 Generally, the most
obvious way for a repossessing party to breach the peace is to engage in
violent behavior,5 ° though courts typically do not require the presence of
actual violence or the threat of violence to find a breach of the peace." One
court provided as follows:
In general terms a breach of the peace is a violation of public order, a dis-
turbance of the public tranquillity [sic], by any act or conduct inciting to
violence or tending to provoke or excite others to break the peace. By
"peace" as used in the law in this connection, is meant the tranquility en-
joyed by citizens of a municipality or community where good order reigns
among its members, which is the right of all persons in political society. 2
Consequently, a creditor's wrongful conduct will only create a breach of
the peace if it is likely to violate public order or create some public disturb-
ance.53 Analysis of Stone Machinery reveals that the court did not properly
48. Stone Mach., 463 P2d at 655.
49. See McRobert, supra note 14, at 578-80 (contrasting courts that use a five-factor
balancing test with those that engage in a fact-specific inquiry).
50. BARKLEY CLARK & BARBARA CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UN-
DER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE I 4.05[2][b][i], at 4-77 (3d ed. 2012) ("The clearest
example of a breach of the peace would be the secured party's banging down the doors of the
house to repossess the piano, drowning the debtor's screams of protest in an ocean of exple-
tives.").
5 I. See, e.g., Thompson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 324 F Supp. 108, 115 (D.S.C. 197 1)
("This court is of the opinion, however, that the tortious act needs no element of violence in
order to constitute a breach of the peace."); Davenport v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 818 S.W.2d
23, 29 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) ("[N]either violence, the threat of violence, nor personal con-
frontation is necessary in order for a secured party's conduct to amount to a breach of the
peace.").
52. McKee v. State, 132 P.2d 173, 177 (Okla. Crim. App. 1942) (quoting 8 RULING
CASE LAW § 305, at 284 (William M. McKinney & Burdett A. Rich eds., 1915)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Stone Machinery drew its definition of breach of the peace from this
case. 463 P.2d at 654.
53. See, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Koontz, 661 N.E.2d 1171, 1173 (IIl. App. Ct.
1996) ("We therefore conclude that the term 'breach of the peace' connotes conduct which
incites or is likely to incite immediate public turbulence, or which leads to or is likely to lead
to an immediate loss of public order and tranquility."); Davenport, 818 S.W.2d at 29 (conclud-
ing that while violence or threat of violence is not required to breach the peace, any "conduct
that is 'incompatible with the tranquility and good order which governments are organized to




apply this principle. The fact that a public disturbance could have occurred
but for an officer's involvement should not constitute a breach of the peace,
as the mere presence of an officer does not create a public disturbance.54 It
seems that the court itself recognized the weakness in its argument as it con-
cluded that law-enforcement presence alone was not necessarily a breach of
the peace but would always allow the creditor to circumvent the statute by
utilizing the assistance of law-enforcement officers.5
Stone Machinery's ultimate concern regarding statutory circumvention is
unpersuasive. The prevention of breach of the peace due to the officer's
presence is no different from the repo man engaging in a stealthy, nighttime
repossession or a clever ruse.56 Put simply, if the officer's presence does not
independently constitute a breach of the peace (that is, if it is not the type of
public disturbance that we would normally consider a breach of the peace),
the creditor has satisfied the statutory requirement regardless of the method
of repossession employed. 7 Courts should not seek to take away nonviolent
or nonwrongful means of repossession from creditors for the sake of level-
ing the playing field between parties who knowingly entered into a binding
security agreement.
C. Fallacy of the Right to Object
The notion that a debtor has the "right to object" is inconsistent with
other principles of repossession. In fact, many state statutes subject the
debtor to damage payments for failing to make collateral available or for
wrongfully damaging collateral. s 8 Moreover, some states even criminalize
acts undertaken by the debtor with intent to limit a creditor's ability to effec-
tuate a repossession,5 9 and several courts have held that the debtor's mere
54. This argument is even more tenuous when considered using a definition of breach of
the peace that requires at least the existence of the threat of violence. Under such a formulation,
questionable behavior (such as utilizing the assistance of law enforcement) would never be
considered a breach of the peace without the threat of violence.
55. Stone Mach., 463 P.2d at 655.
56. See generally CLARK & CLARK, supra note 50, 4.05[2][b][i], at 4-80 ("The courts
have generally held that a little stealth is all in the game of repossession.").
57. Nonetheless, there may be a point at which the officer's involvement can be so
intimidating to the debtor that it makes the repossession wrongful, perhaps where accompa-
nied by threat of force or active involvement in the repossession. See supra notes 22-25 and
accompanying text for examples of intimidating conduct by law enforcement in the context of
pre-UCC repossession.
58. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-5501 (2003 & Supp. 2012); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 5-5-103 (2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-45-103(5) (2005); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.5-
5-103(5) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 5-103(4) (2009); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 325G.22(2) (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70C-701(3)(b) (LexisNexis
2009); W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-119(6) (LexisNexis 2006). Many of these state provisions are
adopted from the UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.103(5) (1968).
59. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § l1.46.730(a)(1)(B) (2010) (stating that a debtor criminally
defrauds a creditor where he knowingly "destroys, removes, conceals, encumbers, transfers, or
otherwise deals with that property with intent to hinder enforcement of that security interest");
CAL. PENAL CODE § 154(a) (West 1999 & Supp. 2012) (providing that a "debtor who ...
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refusal to make the collateral available is sufficient to implicate these stat-
utes.60 These statutes reflect an understanding that where a creditor has a
valid security interest, the debtor's role is to serve as a facilitator, not an agi-
tator. Stone Machinery's notion of the debtor's fight to object runs counter
to these statutes.
Similarly, at least one court has expressly held that the debtor has a du-
ty not to impede a lawful repossession. In Texas National Bank v. Sandia
Mortgage Corp., the Fifth Circuit held that a debtor has a contractual duty
"not to interfere or hinder [a creditor's] right to perform its side of the
contract. '61 While the case dealt specifically with the interpretation of a
Texas statute,62 the court based the ruling on its understanding of former
section 9-503, so the decision is broadly applicable. Like the above refer-
enced statutes,63 this case presents the relationship between debtor and
creditor in a way that would not grant the debtor a right to object in the
face of an otherwise lawful repossession.
Moreover, by holding that a breach of the peace can arise from the debt-
or's right to object, Stone Machinery makes section 9-609 internally
contradictory. Specifically, section 9-609(c) provides that "[i]f so agreed,
and in any event after default, a secured party may require the debtor to as-
semble the collateral and make it available to the secured party at a place to
be designated by the secured party which is reasonably convenient to both
parties."' The import is clear: the debtor has a duty to actively assist the
secured party in repossessing collateral. At the very least, this section is at
odds with a rule that would encourage the debtor to object to an otherwise
lawful repossession and would penalize the secured party who frustrates that
"right." However, that is exactly the result of applying Stone Machinery's
interpretation of the rule from what is now section 9-609(b).
Only when a breach of the peace is thought to depend upon a debtor's
fight to object are these statutory provisions in conflict. Absent Stone Machin-
ery's holding, the statute is clear. The UCC obligates the debtor to cooperate
with a repossession.65 It prohibits breaches of the peace, meaning that where
the debtor does not comply with the repossession efforts, the secured party is
fraudulently sells, conveys, assigns or conceals his or her property with intent to defraud,
hinder or delay his or her creditors" is subject to imprisonment and a fine). There is also a
federal statute prohibiting such conduct in the context of farm credit agencies. 18 U.S.C. § 658
(2006).
60. E.g., Montgomery v. State, 91 S.W.3d 426, 431 (Tex. App. 2002). Other courts have
held that mere refusal to make collateral available does not implicate criminal statutes. For a
discussion of this issue, see CARTER, supra note 9, § 6.2.4.2, at 202-05.
61. 872 F.2d 692, 698 (5th Cir. 1989).
62. Specifically, the court was considering the issue of whether a breach of contract
occurred for the purposes of applying Texas's attorney's fees statute. Tex. Nat'l Bank, 872 F.2d
at 698.
63. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.




not at liberty to continue with the repossession. 66 However, that does not au-
thorize or encourage the debtor to make the repossession difficult. Where
the debtor does not actually object, therefore, the secured party cannot be
held liable for infringing on the debtor's "right."
It is also difficult to explain why a right to object should exist solely in
this context. Why does a routine driveway repossession of which the debtor
is unaware not implicate this rule? 67 Taken to its logical conclusion, such a
right would require that the secured party give advance notice to the debtor
to enable him to exercise his right to object.68 This would clearly limit the
economy of self-help repossession 69 and would blur the line between self-
help repossession and repossession through judicial process. 70
Thus, while an officer's actions during a repossession could create a
breach of the peace in limited circumstances, the "right to object" approach
does not explain a per se restriction on officer involvement in self-help re-
possessions. Courts, however, have discussed an alternative justification for
finding a breach of the peace in cases of officer involvement: state action.
Generally, the concern is that the law-enforcement officer is a state actor and
cannot deprive the debtor of private property without notice and a hearing,
at the risk of violating the debtor's constitutional rights. The following Part
addresses this state-action issue.
II. SELF-HELP REPOSSESSION AS STATE ACTION
This Part introduces a state-action approach to law-enforcement
involvement in self-help repossession. Section II.A sets forth the existing
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the issue of state action and self-help
repossession, which holds that a typical self-help repossession does not
constitute state action. Section II.B considers how the involvement of a law-
enforcement officer during a self-help repossession can affect the state-action
calculus. Section II.C argues that only when a law-enforcement officer's
involvement in a self-help repossession becomes repossession-facilitating
rather than peacekeeping does the repossession become wrongful. Section
H.D discusses the ways in which courts have misused the state-action doctrine
so that the result is no better than that yielded by the "right to object"
approach discussed in Part I.
66. See id. § 9-609(b)(2).
67. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 26-7, at 1336 ("We have found no case
which holds that the repossession of an automobile from a driveway or public street (absent
other circumstances, such as the debtor's objection) itself constitutes a breach of the peace.").
68. See Braucher, supra note 10, at 581 ("If the right to object applied in all reposses-
sions, not just those involving a surprise interruption, creditors might then have to give notice
of a repossession so that the debtor could arrange to be present to object.").
69. See Dunagan, supra note 8 and accompanying text.
70. Cf CARTER, supra note 9, § 6.3.2, at 205-07 (discussing the few states in which a
creditor may not repossess collateral without authorization from the debtor).
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A. Overview of Creditors'Remedies as State Action
Because repossession involves depriving a debtor of property without
notice and a hearing, the debtor has a plausible claim that a repossession
violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights if the repossession
qualifies as state action.7' Section 1983 of title 42 of the U.S. Code pro-
vides a remedy for a constitutional right violated "under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State."7 2 There are
thus two elements to a § 1983 cause of action: first, a constitutional viola-
tion must have occurred, and second, that violation must have occurred
under color of state law. 3 It is a basic principle of constitutional law that a
constitutional violation cannot occur without state action.74 In § 1983
claims premised on Fourteenth Amendment violations, such as repossession
without notice, courts have, in some cases, treated the "color of state law"
and state-action inquiries as identical.75
The Supreme Court first addressed whether creditors' remedies could
implicate state action in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View.76 At
issue in that case was the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute that al-
lowed a creditor to initiate an action for prejudgment wage garnishment.77
The Court found the statute unconstitutional, noting that prejudgment gar-
nishment was a "taking which may impose tremendous hardship on wage
earners with families to support."7" It was a landmark case,79 and because of
the anti-wage-garnishment polemic of the opinion,80 courts were unsure
whether it should extend to other creditor remedies as well. 8'
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
73. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982) (citing Flagg Bros. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1978)).
74. See id. at 924.
75. See id. at 935 & n.18 ("[W]e hold in this case that the under-color-of-state-law
requirement does not add anything not already included within the state-action requirement of
the Fourteenth Amendment .... "); see also SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 2:11 (4th ed. 2012).
76. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
77. Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 338.
78. Id. at 340.
79. See Barkley Clark & Jonathan M. Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The
Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REV. 355, 355 (1973) ("Nineteen sixty-nine was a
momentous year. In that year the United States put a man on the moon, and in that year the
creditor met the Constitution.").
80. In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Black argued that the majority opinion was
based solely on "emotional rhetoric [that] might be very appropriate for Congressmen to make
against some phases of garnishment laws" but in an opinion by the Court served as "a plain,
judicial usurpation of state legislative power to decide what the State's laws shall be."
Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 344-45 (Black, J., dissenting).
81. Clark & Landers, supra note 79, at 357-58.
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This uncertainty did not last long. In Fuentes v. Shevin,82 the Court
struck down Pennsylvania and Florida prejudgment replevin statutes. 83
Applying Sniadach, the Court held that even a temporary deprivation of
property violated the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore the replevin
statutes were unconstitutional. 4 The Court then took the opportunity to con-
clusively state that Sniadach was to be construed broadly, requiring notice
and a hearing for all temporary deprivations of property except for in "ex-
traordinary situations."85 The Court tempered its sweeping position
somewhat in Mitchell v. W.T Grant Co. 86 by upholding a Louisiana statute
that authorized a writ of sequestration similar to the writ of replevin de-
clared unconstitutional in Fuentes.8 7 Mitchell distinguished the case on its
facts, 88 though a persuasive dissent presented the distinctions as pretenses
for overruling Fuentes.89
Given these holdings, we can see why the constitutionality of former
section 9-503, which authorized self-help repossession, was open to debate.
Commentators differed in their conclusions, 9° and the Supreme Court never
offered a formal resolution. However, in Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, the Court
concluded that a similar self-help remedy authorized by UCC Article 7-a
warehouseman's lien-did not constitute state action.91 Even though New
York's adoption of § 7-210 authorized the deprivation of property, the Court
rejected the argument that "a State's mere acquiescence in a private action
converts that action into that of the State."92 The Court concluded that "the
State of New York ha[d] not compelled the sale of a bailor's goods, but ha[d]
82. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
83. These statutes provided that where a private individual claimed that he was entitled
to seize another's property in replevin, he could apply for a writ of replevin after meeting
specific procedural requirements, even without a formal judgment. A sheriff would then seize
the property and the debtor could challenge the replevy. Clark & Landers, supra note 79, at
359.
84. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 85-86.
85. Id. at 90 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).
86. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
87. See Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 601-02.
88. Id. at 615-17.
89. Id. at 634-35 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("In short, this case is constitutionally indis-
tinguishable from Fuentes v. Shevin, and the Court today has simply rejected the reasoning of
that case and adopted instead the analysis of the Fuentes dissent*"). The seemingly contradic-
tory nature of these cases is likely explained by a change in composition of the Court, as
Justice Stewart noted in his dissent. Id. at 635-36 ("The only perceivable change that has
occurred since Fuentes is in the makeup of this Court.").
90. Compare Robert S. Catz & Edmund H. Robinson, Due Process and Creditor's
Remedies: From Sniadach and Fuentes to Mitchell, North Georgia and Beyond, 28 RUTGERS
L. REV. 541, 579-84 (1975), with Thomas N. McJunkin, Note, State Action and the Constitu-
tionality of UCC § 9-503, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 547 (1973).
91. 436 U.S. 149 (1978). A warehouseman's lien permits a bailee to retain possession
of goods until storage fees are paid. The UCC authorizes the enforcement of the lien through
public or private sale, subject to certain restrictions. U.C.C. § 7-210 (2012).
92. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 164.
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merely announced the circumstances under which its courts will not inter-
fere with a private sale. 9 3
Presumably, the same logic would hold true in self-help repossession,
where the government merely acquiesces to a private party's repossessing
collateral, though the Supreme Court has never expressly spoken on the is-
sue.94 Not surprisingly, a majority of federal circuit and state courts have
extended this reasoning to private repossessions, holding that government
acquiescence alone does not constitute state action.95 The presence of a
law-enforcement officer during a self-help repossession, however, could
transform the repossession into state action, subjecting the self-help repos-
session to the holding of Fuentes. The following Section explores this
issue.
B. State Action and Self-Help Repossession
While a garden-variety self-help repossession does not violate the Con-
stitution, the presence of a law-enforcement officer at a repossession makes
the case for a due process violation significantly stronger. Debtors often
bring such constitutional claims against law-enforcement officers rather than
private actors, thus presenting no breach-of-the-peace issue.96 A common
example of this is Marcus v. McCollum, where the Tenth Circuit denied
qualified immunity to law-enforcement officers who became involved in an
automobile repossession after the parties began arguing heatedly.97
In evaluating the merits of the action, the court noted that while the
Tenth Circuit had never considered whether law-enforcement-officer in-
volvement in a private party's repossession of property could constitute state
action, other circuits had done so. The Tenth Circuit summarized the general
treatment that those circuits have adopted for such claims, stating that where
officers act only to keep the peace during a private repossession, they are not
deemed state actors. If they participate to facilitate the repossession, howev-
er, they are considered state actors.98
This distinction is not a binary one but a continuum. As the Second Circuit
explained, "When an officer begins to take a more active hand in the reposses-
sion, and as such involvement becomes increasingly critical, a point may be
reached at which police assistance at the scene of a private repossession may
93. Id. at 166.
94. CARTER, supra note 9, § 6.3.6.1, at 213-14.
95. Id. § 6.3.6.1, at 214 nn.169-71 (providing a lengthy list of cases holding that self-
help repossession does not constitute state action).
96. E.g., Marcus v. McCollum, 394 E3d 813, 817, 819-20 (10th Cir. 2004). Private
actors can be sued under § 1983 as well, Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928 n.8
(1982), though such suits are less common than suits against law-enforcement officers, see
Allison Hartwell Eid, Private Party Immunities to Section 1983 Suits, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
1323, 1326 (1990).
97. Marcus, 394 F.3d at 815-17.
98. Id. at 818.
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cause the repossession to take on the character of state action."9 9 Because it
would be difficult to provide an ex ante list of law-enforcement behavior
that would be far enough along the continuum to qualify as state action,
courts instead engage in a fact-specific inquiry that requires careful judicial
deliberation."' °
The following Sections focus on the relationship between the state-action
component of the § 1983 inquiry and the breach-of-the-peace component of
the section 9-609 inquiry. They also examine the effect that this relationship
can have on private self-help repossessions. They argue that the best approach
to law-enforcement-officer presence at self-help repossession is to conduct a
fact-specific inquiry into whether the presence was peacekeeping or
repossession-facilitating, where repossession-facilitating law-enforcement
presence renders the repossession wrongful under the UCC. This inquiry
should mirror the one courts undertake to decide questions of state action,
described earlier in this Section.01
C. The Proper State-Action Approach
The best approach to law-enforcement presence at self-help repossessions
relies on the logic that, when an element of state action is introduced into a
repossession, the repossession is no longer statutorily authorized. As men-
tioned above, the UCC only condones two forms of repossession: self-help
(without a breach of the peace) and repossession through judicial process. 102 If
an officer helps with a repossession, it may no longer count as self-help and
would certainly not count as judicial process. This rationale was articulated
by the New Mexico Supreme Court's holding in Waisner v. Jones that "the
presence of a law-enforcement official, without judicial process, removes a
repossession from the ambit of [New Mexico's self-help statute] and places
it among conduct proscribed by either the fifth or fourteenth amendments."'10 3
Waisner correctly identified an association between state action and statutory
self-help repossession, though it categorically stated that an officer's "pres-
ence" transforms a valid self-help repossession into a constitutional
violation."° This presentation is at odds with the majority of circuits noted
99. Barrett v. Harwood, 189 F.3d 297, 302 (2d Cir. 1999). Other circuits have held this
way as well. E.g., Cofield v. Randolph Cnty. Comm'n, 90 F.3d 468, 471 (1 lth Cir. 1996) (stat-
ing that where an officer facilitates a repossession, state action might be present); Harris v.
City of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[Plolice intervention and aid in the
repossession does constitute state action."); United States v. Coleman, 628 E2d 961, 964 &
n. 1 (6th Cir. 1980) (listing facilitative behaviors that would constitute state action); Menchaca
v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 513 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[P]olice intervention and aid in
this repossession ... would constitute state action... .
100. Marcus, 394 F.3d at 819.
101. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
102. U.C.C. § 9-609(c) (2012).
103. 755 P.2d 598, 602 (N.M. 1988); see also MacLeod v. C & G Inv. Grp. (In re Mac-
Leod), 118 B.R. 1, 3 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1990) ("The repossession .. , with the assistance of the
state police was not a self-help repossession and accordingly was unlawful.").
104. Waisner, 755 P.2d at 602.
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above, which view officer involvement for purposes of state action along a
continuum. 105
Once we frame the problem of officer involvement as one of nonstatuto-
rily authorized repossession, we must then consider to what extent an
officer's actions will remove a repossession from the ambit of section 9-609.
It is conceivable that a lesser amount of law-enforcement action, while not
enough for a § 1983 claim, would be sufficient to invalidate a repossession.
This possibility rests on the assumption that "self-help" cannot contain any
nonprivate element. As Professor Braucher has noted, "[B]y authorizing a
secured party to proceed without judicial process, [section 9-6091 implicitly
disapproves of using law officers without first getting the right to do so by use
of judicial process."10 6 This inference is consistent with at least one generally
accepted definition of self-help: "legally permissible conduct that individuals
undertake absent the compulsion of law and without the assistance of a
government official in efforts to prevent or remedy a legal wrong."'0 7 This
definition suggests that government involvement that would be insufficient to
trigger constitutional due process requirements would nonetheless be suffi-
cient to remove a repossession from the ambit of self-help.
The best approach, however, is likely to treat the quantum of law-
enforcement involvement required to constitute a wrongful repossession as
equal to that required to constitute a § 1983 claim. An officer's
involvement that does not reach a level of constitutional moment should be
insignificant for purposes of section 9-609 as well. This approach is still
consistent with the above-referenced definition of self-help. Where an
officer's actions are peacekeeping in nature, he stands passively near the
scene of a repossession. He takes action only if violence erupts, and then
merely to restore the peace, not to ensure the repossession's completion.
The purpose of his presence is therefore not to remedy a legal wrong but
to carry out the generally accepted role of law-enforcement officers. Any
ancillary benefit provided to repossessors is irrelevant for the purposes of
self-help.
Put simply, the same standard that courts apply to answer the state-
action question should also determine the self-help question. Accordingly,
an officer's mere presence designed only to keep the peace at the scene of
a repossession-alone insufficient to trigger a constitutional violation-
should not transform a lawful repossession into an unlawful one under
section 9-609. In contrast, where law-enforcement officers intend to assist
a creditor in an effort to repossess an asset, such involvement should be
state action, and courts should deem the repossession wrongful because it
would qualify as neither a self-help repossession nor a judicial process
105. See cases cited supra note 99 and accompanying text.
106. Braucher, supra note 10, at 581.
107. See, e.g., Douglas Ivor Brandon et al., Self-Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges
and Remedies in Contemporary American Society, 37 VAND. L. REv. 845, 850 (1984).
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repossession. '1 The difficulty for courts lies in determining which of these
functions-facilitating a repossession or keeping the peace-an officer's
actions serve.10 9
As a final matter, courts should consider an unauthorized repossession
due to law-enforcement involvement a wrongful repossession, rather than a
breach of the peace. Wrongful repossession is an umbrella term that in-
cludes the more specific breach of the peace." As I have shown, an officer's
presence can violate section 9-609 because it is not statutorily authorized,
regardless of the likelihood of violence. One of the problems with the pre-
vailing doctrine is the oddity of discussing passive law-enforcement-officer
presence as a "breach of the peace." Referring to the problem of officer in-
volvement as a "wrongful repossession" is more precise and makes the legal
framework logically coherent."'
D. Misuse of the State-Action Approach
Simply introducing state-action analysis does not solve the problem, as
courts that employ state-action analysis are prone to fall into the same pit-
falls as courts that employ the flawed "right to object" analysis discussed in
Part I. For example, an Arizona court of appeals, while addressing the ques-
tion of whether a repossessing party had breached the peace, held "that the
introduction of law-enforcement officers into the area of self-help reposses-
sion, regardless of their degree of participation or nonparticipation in the
actual events, would constitute state action, thereby invalidating a reposses-
sion without a proper notice and hearing.""' This incorrectly assumes that
law-enforcement presence automatically constitutes state action, creating a
108. For an example of a court utilizing this framework, see United States v. Coleman,
628 F.2d 961, 964 (6th Cir. 1980) ("[The officers'] benign attendance was not designed to
assist [the repossession agent] in repossession of the truck; rather, it was in furtherance of their
official duties. .. . [M]ere acquiescence by the police to 'stand by in case of trouble' was in-
sufficient to convert the repossession of the truck into state action." (footnote omitted)).
109. See infra Section Ill.B for examples.
110. See 42 AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts § 2 (1997).
111. See Braucher, supra note 10, at 581 ("[The rationale] would be more credibly stated
if it were not in terms of breach of the peace or a right of objection.").
It is also possible that a significant divergence between labeling officer involvement as a
"breach of the peace" and "wrongful repossession" may lie in whether the parties could con-
sent to a law-enforcement-assisted repossession in their security agreement. Section 9-602 of
the UCC governs waiver and variance of Article 9's repossession provisions and states that
"the debtor or obligor may not waive or vary the rules stated in ... [s]ection 9-609 to the ex-
tent that it imposes upon a secured party that takes possession of collateral without judicial
process the duty to do so without breach of the peace." U.C.C. § 9-602 (2012).
In other words, parties may not waive the prohibition on breaching the peace in a self-
help repossession. If law-enforcement involvement is classified as a breach of the peace, the
debtor may not preemptively agree to permit it. If, however, the involvement falls outside
section 9-609's breach of the peace rule, the parties would be free to contract to permit a se-
cured party to repossess with the aid of a law-enforcement officer for peacekeeping purposes.
112. Walker v. Walthall, 588 P.2d 863, 866 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978).
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bright-line prohibition on law-enforcement presence that is identical in effect
to the holding in Stone Machinery.
The significance of this analysis is most apparent when contrasting it
with courts that keep the state-action and breach-of-the-peace inquiries
entirely separate. For example, in Wallace v. Chrysler Credit Corp., an off-
duty law-enforcement officer repossessed the plaintiff's truck in the middle
of the night." 3 The plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim against the officer and
separately alleged that both the officer and the creditor had breached the
peace, violating Virginia's self-help repossession statute." 4 The court first
considered and dismissed the breach of the peace claim on the grounds that
the repossession took place at two o'clock in the morning and the debtor did
not interpose or object at the time of the repossession. 15 It then evaluated
the § 1983 claim, concluding that it too lacked merit because the officer's
actions did not constitute state action." 6 These were entirely independent
inquiries; the result in one had no bearing on the other
17
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
The discussion thus far has presented a theoretical framework for courts to
use in evaluating cases of law-enforcement involvement in a self-help repos-
session. Whether a law-enforcement officer's presence at a self-help
repossession will render the repossession wrongful depends on whether the
officer's presence transforms the repossession into state action, which itself
depends on the level of officer involvement. The closer an officer's actions
come to facilitating the repossession, the more likely it is that there will be
state action sufficient to remove the repossession from the ambit of section
9-609.11 In furtherance of this goal, Section III.A proposes a modification
to section 9-609's Official Comments that summarizes the state-action ap-
proach. Section III.B applies the framework to a number of examples to
demonstrate its application.
113. 743 F. Supp. 1228, 1229-30 (W.D. Va. 1990).
114. Wallace, 743 F. Supp. at 1230. Virginia's statute parallels former UCC section 9-
503. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-503 (1990) (repealed 2001), with U.C.C. § 9-609 (2012)
(formerly U.C.C. § 9-503 (2001)).
115. Wallace, 743 E Supp. at 1233.
116. Id. at 1235 ("[T]he allegations... make no suggestion or even hint that [the officer]
was using his power as an agent of the state in effecting the actual repossession; rather, he
acted as any private individual undertaking the same action would have done. His status as a
deputy was completely irrelevant." (footnote and citation omitted)).
117. Id. For another example of a court refusing to connect the state-action and breach-
of-the-peace inquiries, see First & Farmers Bank of Somerset, Inc. v. Henderson, 763 S.W.2d
137, 141 n.5 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988). There, the court faced a breach-of-the-peace claim based on
an officer's involvement and distinguished cases that discussed officer involvement in the
context of state action. Id. ("We do not find [such cases] exceptionally helpful since the degree
of intervention by the officer necessary in our analysis is less than a finding that the state com-
pelled the private party through the actions of the officer to act as he did.").
118. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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A. Proposed Modification to Section 9-609's Official Comments
As noted above, section 9-609's current Official Comment 3 seems to
adopt the bright-line anti-law-enforcement rule that several courts apply. Of
course, one could read the Comment's imperative against utilizing the "as-
sistance of a law-enforcement officer" to support the distinction I have
drawn between peacekeeping and repossession-facilitating actions. That is,
only the "assistance" of an officer, rather than an officer's passive observa-
tion, would be problematic. If this result is the Comment's intention, it
should say so expressly. Similarly, to this point in the discussion I have pre-
sented as problematic the misconception that an officer's involvement
breaches the peace. While the Comment does not label officer involvement a
breach of the peace, it could more clearly distinguish between wrongful re-
possession and breach of the peace. The UCC commentary generally
receives "considerable weight"' I9 and accuracy is therefore paramount.
Based on the foregoing analysis, this Note recommends incorporating
the following language into the Official Comments to section 9-609:
Under former Section 9-503 and current Section 9-609, the involvement of
law-enforcement officers in self-help repossession does not necessarily
constitute a breach of the peace or otherwise invalidate a repossession.
However, the use of law-enforcement officers to aid in repossession, rather
than to keep the peace, can constitute state action. In addition to implicat-
ing procedural due process concerns, this would serve to remove a
repossession from the types authorized by this Section, thereby invalidat-
ing it. Whether the involvement of law-enforcement officers constitutes
state action requires a fact-specific inquiry.
This language would improve the current Comment in several ways. First,
it rejects the "right to object" theory discussed in Section I.B. Second, it
distinguishes between peacekeeping and repossession-facilitating actions by
the officer, more accurately reflecting the current legal landscape regarding
the state-action question. Third, it extends this distinction to determining the
validity of a repossession, noting that where an officer's involvement is
sufficient to constitute state action, such involvement is also statutorily
unauthorized. Fourth, it correctly describes the potential problem as
nonstatutorily authorized repossession, rather than as a breach of the peace.
Finally, it makes clear that the nature of an officer's involvement depends
on the specific facts of each case.
B. Application of the State-Action Approach
The approach outlined above would still challenge courts to distinguish
between peacekeeping and repossession-facilitating actions. I offer several
119. 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 1.9, at 47 (3d ed. 2004);
see also JOM, Inc. v. Adell Plastics, Inc., 193 E3d 47, 57 n.6 (1st Cir. 1999) ("UCC Official
Comments 'do not have the force of law, but are nonetheless the most useful of several aids to
interpretation and construction of the [UCC].' ").
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hypothetical scenarios to illustrate how a court might evaluate officer in-
volvement in self-help repossessions. 120
Scenario One: Creditor seeks to repossess an automobile from Debtor.
To protect himself, Creditor enlists the help of local Law-Enforcement Of-
ficer to stand by in case violence ensues. Officer remains in his car down the
street from Debtor's home while Creditor attaches the collateral to a tow
truck. Debtor does not see Officer and only becomes aware of his presence
after the repossession is complete.
Analysis: Officer in this case did not actively assist in repossessing the
collateral. Nor did his presence aid Creditor in any meaningful way. This is
a clear case of Officer acting pursuant to his official duties. Even under the
current state of the law, courts have correctly decided that Officer's conduct
in this scenario is permissible.
Scenario Two: The facts are the same as in Scenario One, but Officer
parks in view of Debtor's home. Debtor exits his home while Creditor at-
taches the collateral to a tow truck. Upon seeing Officer's car, Debtor
returns to his home and does not protest the repossession.
Analysis: As in Scenario One, Officer in this case did not actively assist
in repossessing the collateral. Unlike in Scenario One, however, Officer's
presence likely contributed to Creditor's ability to repossess the collateral.
Applying the "right to object" rationale, some courts have deemed this sce-
nario an invalid self-help repossession.121 A court applying the approach
proposed in this Note, however, would likely find this scenario to be a per-
missible repossession because Officer played a peacekeeping role. Officer
participated to prevent violence, not to facilitate the repossession.
Scenario Three: The facts are the same as in Scenario Two, but instead
of remaining in his car to observe the situation, Officer accompanies Credi-
tor to Debtor's front door. Creditor informs Debtor that he plans to repossess
the collateral. Officer says nothing, standing by in case of violence.
Analysis: This scenario is likely the most difficult for a court to assess.
On the one hand, Officer is merely present to prevent violence. Yet by ac-
companying Creditor to Debtor's front door, Officer potentially becomes
an active participant in the repossession.1 22 Despite the difficulty, this type
of involvement should be insufficient to invalidate the repossession. It is
120. A word of caution is in order. The examples in this Section are for illustrative pur-
poses only. Because the rightfulness or wrongfulness of repossession turns on the state-action
question, a complete consideration of potential scenarios requires in-depth analysis of the
divide between state and private action in § 1983 cases. Such a survey is beyond the scope of
this Note. For an extensive list of cases addressing the state-private action divide, see
NAHMOD, supra note 75, § 2:13.
121. See, e.g., Walker v. Walthall, 588 P.2d 863, 866 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) ("[T]he intro-
duction of law enforcement officers into the area of self-help repossession, regardless of their
degree of participation or non-participation in the actual events, would constitute state action,
thereby invalidating a repossession without a proper notice and hearing."). The Walker court's
sweeping statement indicates that it might have found the facts of Scenario One to constitute
an invalid repossession as well.
122. Cf WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 4, § 26-7, at 1336 (noting a distinction between
repossessions that take place at various distances from the home).
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substantively no different than Scenario Two; Officer is simply closer to the
action. It would be helpful for Officer to make it clear to Debtor that his
presence is solely to prevent violence and that he in no way validates or
seeks to assist in the repossession.
Scenario Four: The facts are the same as in Scenario Three, where in-
stead of remaining in his car to observe the situation, Officer accompanies
Creditor to Debtor's front door. Creditor informs Debtor that he plans to
repossess the collateral. Officer now warns Debtor that Creditor has a right
to repossess the automobile and cautions that "violence will not be tolerat-
ed." Debtor protests but does nothing to prevent the repossession.
Analysis: This scenario is likely an impermissible form of law-
enforcement involvement. While Officer's warning ostensibly serves only to
limit violence, his more active role at the outset in speaking words of warn-
ing to Debtor serves to facilitate the repossession more than in the former
scenarios. This is especially true because Officer's statements make clear
that he is an active participant in the repossession.
Scenario Five: The facts are the same as in Scenario Four, but Officer is
off-duty, serving in a "civil standby" capacity. He wears his uniform and
does nothing to indicate that he is on civil standby.'23
Analysis: This is impermissible aid by an officer acting under color of
state law. Because Officer is off-duty, he is not engaged in his professional
role in minimizing violence. Although working off the clock, Officer is still
acting under the vestiges of state law. In Monroe v. Pape, the Supreme Court
held that for purposes of § 1983, state officials act "under color of' state law
even when acting in contravention of state law.'24 In this scenario, Officer's
involvement constitutes state action for § 1983 purposes; hence, the repos-
session takes on the character of state action and is therefore wrongful.
The above illustrations represent the difficulty courts face in determining
how much law-enforcement involvement in a repossession is too much. It is
conceivable that a court will factor a number of variables into its conclusion.
For instance, if a repo agent has had a prior history with a debtor and knows
him to be a violent individual, a court may more readily accept that Officer's
sole purpose at the scene is to keep the peace. Whatever the individual fac-
tors used by courts to determine the nature of the officer's involvement,
tying the inquiry to state action will allow courts to more readily ground
their decisions in an established body of case law.
123. This was the case in MacLeod v. C & G Inv. Grp. (In re MacLeod), 118 B.R. 1
(Bankr. D.N.H. 1990). Law-enforcement officers on civil standby "are paid by a private party
to assist in matters like preventing violence at the scene of a domestic quarrel, directing traffic
at a highway construction project, or escorting a wideload truck." Id. at 1.
124. 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961) ("Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and
made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action
taken 'under color' of state law." (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326
(1941))).
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CONCLUSION
With self-help repossessions enduring as a mainstay of the consumer-
credit industry, it is important that we correctly understand and consistently
apply the laws of repossession. The current leading position related to of-
ficer involvement in self-help repossession is based on a "right" that debtors
do not possess: the right to object. Rather than treating any level of officer
involvement as a per se breach of the peace, courts must instead begin by
characterizing the officer's actions for purposes of § 1983. Where an of-
ficer's behavior constitutes state action for constitutional purposes, such
behavior correspondingly makes the repossession unauthorized by statute
and therefore wrongful. The Official Comments to section 9-609 should
clearly state this more accurate and nuanced approach.
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